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intent,77 there would seem to be some need for court review on an ex-
panded basis. Court opinions are carefully read in the Department of
Justice, which plays a major part in the draft process. 78 This unques-
tionably has had the effect of reducing arbitrary decisions and potential
administrative tyranny.7 9 Even under emergency conditions the con-
cept of certain minimum standards of due process and fair dealing, for
the nonconformist as well as the conformist, forms a part of our tradi-
tion of liberty.80
LEWIS POINDEXTER WATTS, JR.
Operation of Pathological and X-Ray Facilities by Charitable
Hospital as Corporate Practice of Medicine
A decision' of national significance was recently handed down by the
district court of Iowa in an action involving the right of 170 hospitals,
which comprise plaintiff-Iowa Hospital Association, to continue to
operate pathology and X-ray laboratories and collect for these services
from patients. 2  The court ruled that the hospitals, in purveying these
services to patients, were illegally engaged in the practice of medicine.
" 62 STAT. 620 (1948), as amended 50 U. S. C. Ap'. § 460 (b) (3) (1952), has
not been changed insofar as it relates to administrative finality; yet Congress has
amended or added several sections to the act, e.g., 1955 Amendments to the Uni-
versal Military Training and Service Act, Act of June 30, 1955, c. 250, 69 STAT.
223 (codified in scattered sections of 50 U. S. C. App.). Note also 69 STAT.
602 (1955), 50 U. S. C. A. App. §§ 454 (d) (3), 456 (c) (2), (d) (1)-(2)
(Supp. August 1955).
"8 Shipley, Conscientious Objection--A Legal Right, 13 FED. B. J. 282, 286
(1953) (Mr. Shipley is listed as a Special Assistant to the Attorney General of
the United States).
" Cf. United States v. Hagaman, 312 F. 2d 86, 89 (3d Cir. 1954): "[I]n re-
cent months Courts of Appeals have had to consider a whole series of rather
similar cases where unexplained orders of the national board changing the classi-
fication of Jehovah's Witnesses from 1-0 to 1-A make sense only if they repre-
ent a consistent administrative application of this understandable, if mistaken,
legal theory [that Jehovah's Witnesses are as a matter of law not conscientious
objectors because of their belief in 'theocratic war']." See note 55 supra.
Tietz, Jehovah's Witnesses: Conscientious Objectors, 28 So. CALIF. L. REy.
123, 135-36 & nn. 38-39 (1955), tells of the use of suspended sentences to prevent
injustice. The District Court suspended Palmer's sentence rather than send him
to prison a second time. Tietz mentions that one Jehovah's Witness has been
prosecuted four times.
so See Falbo v. United States, 320 U. S. 549, 555-61 (1944) (dissenting opinion
of Murphy, J.).
Iowa Hospital Association, et al., v. Iowa State Board of Medical Examiners;
et. al, Iowa State Medical Society, Intervenor, an unreported decision of the
District Court, Ninth Judicial District of Iowa, Des Moines, Iowa, No. 63095,
Equity, decided 28 Nov., 1955.
2 Plaintiffs, because of a ruling of the Attorney General of Iowa dated 19
February, 1954, to the effect that operation by hospitals of laboratory and X-ray
facilities, with billing of the patients by the hospitals, violated the Iowa Medical
Practice Acts (Iowa Code, ch. 147), sought a declaratory judgment. In addition
to the defendant and intervenor, the suit was defended by the Attorney General
of Iowa.
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The court found as a fact that the arrangements employed in operating
these laboratory and X-ray services have been almost universally adopted
by hospitals throughout the United States.m 3
The facts giving rise to the controversy may be summarized as fol-
lows: 4 In all plaintiff-hospitals, operated as non-profit corporations,
pathology laboratory procedures of a routine nature are undertaken by
lay technicians employed by the hospitals. This work is done only at
the request of the attending physician, to whom the technician reports
his findings. In 127 of the 170 hospitals there is no full-or-part-time
pathologist, but the routine laboratory work is done under the super-
vision of a physician, and those laboratory procedures requiring more
highly skilled determinations are accomplished on a mail or delivery
basis by a pathologist in a nearby city. The hospital collects the charges
from the patient for these services, including those of the pathologist,
and compensates the pathologist on a per case or per examination basis.
In those hospitals having a full-or-part-time pathologist, the billing
arrangement is the same, the only difference being that the laboratory
is under the supervision of the pathologist, and he is compensated on a
salary or percentage of laboratory income basis, the latter being more
common. The plaintiffs, in supplying X-ray services, employ X-ray
technicians and all have either a full-or-part-time radiologist, with a
system of billing of patients and compensation of radiologists substanti-
ally like the arrangements with the pathologists.
It was agreed that there had been no actual interference by the hos-
pital trustees or administrators with the professional services of the
pathologists and radiologists and that the dispute did not involve the
quality of laboratory and X-ray services.0
Upon these facts, the court concluded that: (1) the work done by
the pathologists, radiologists, and the technicians working in the path-
ology and X-ray laboratories (italics supplied) constitutes the practice
of medicine; (2) under Iowa law the privilege of practicing medicine
At the conclusion of the trial, the house of delegates of the American Medical
Association approved a resolution congratulating the physicians who had labored to
bring about the initial phase of what they described as a decision which will
have a far reaching effect upon the practice of medicine throughout the nation.
Vol. 86, The Modem Hospital, 49, January 1956.
* From the statement of facts, opinion of the court.
Procedures undertaken are in seven categories, to wit: 1) bacteriology, 2)
blood bank and serology, 3) biochemistry, 4) hematology, 5) urinalysis, 6) special
tests, and 7) pathologic anatomy, although in many hospitals facilities are available
for only a portion of these. The work in the first six categories is considered of
a routine nature, and comprises about 90-95% of all laboratory work.
' Indeed all defendant's testified that they were well satisfied with their relation-
ships with the hospitals, and that their concern was only with the system of billing.
Conclude Hearings in Iowa, Vol. 86, The Modern Hospital, Dec. 1955.
The court remarked that, under all arrangements, the doctor and the hospital
do very well financially.
[Vol. 34
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is a personal one requiring qualifications which cannot be met by a
corporation; and (3) plaintiff-hospitals are not excluded from the pro-
visions of the Iowa Practice Acts because they are non-profit corpora-
tions, or because of long standing custom, or public policy, and therefore
have been engaged in the unauthorized, unlicensed and illegal practice
of medicine.
The case has been appealed by the plaintiff-Iowa Hospital Associa-
tion.7 Because of the possible far reaching effects of the decision, it may
be worthwhile to examine the court's reasoning and authorities to de-
termine the probable outcome on appeal.
(1) In support of its finding that the work done by the pathologist
and radiologist constitutes the practice of medicine, the court cited the
cases of State v. Hughey8 and State v. HowardO for the proposition that
one who diagnoses is engaged in the practice of medicine. The court
also cited with approval the case of Granger v. Adson,'0 in which a lay-
man was conducting a health audit. For a fee of $10 a year, plaintiff
contracted to furnish four urinalyses and a blood pressure test to his
subscribers. It appeared that a Dr. Graves, a pathologist, had been
hired by plaintiff to perform these tests. After holding that the path-
ologist was engaged in practicing medicine, the Minnesota court said:"
"If Dr. Graves was practicing medicine in what he did and in de-
termining for the plaintiff whether the condition of the urine was normal
or abnormal, then, in our opinion, the plaintiff was practicing medicine
when he passed on to his subscribers the result of the analysis...."
In finding that the work done by the hospital technicians constitutes
the practice of medicine, 12 the court relied upon a broad interpretation
of the Iowa Medical Practice Act,'3 and reasoned that from the work
" At a general assembly meeting of the Iowa Hospital Association the vote was
unanimous to appeal the ruling. A. A. Herrick and Herschel G. Langdon, at-
torneys for the plaintiff, estimated the appeal would take one year. Vol. 86, The
Modern Hospital, 51, Jan. 1956.
0208 Iowa 842, 226 N. W. 371 (1929). This case involved a "magnetic healer"
who laid on hands to cure after purporting to determine the physical ailment.
0 216 Iowa 545, 249 N. W. 391 (1933). In this case defendant was enjoined
from practicing medicine after 21 years practice of naprapathy, a supposed science
by which the defendant purported to diagnose illnesses, previously unknown to
medical science, and then to cure them.
10210 Minn. 113, 250 N. W. 722 (1933).
11210 Minn. 113, 115, 250 N. W. 722, 723 (1933).
In Chicago at a special meeting of the American Hospital Association called
to discuss the ruling in the instant case, attorneys for the Association agreed that
the most damaging aspect of the decision, as well as the one most likely to be over-
ruled on appeal, was the ruling that laboratory and X-ray technicians are engaged
in the practice of medicine. The Modern Hospital, note 7, mipra.
", Iowa Code, ch. 148.1, is the relevant portion. Persons engaged it; Practice.
For the purpose of this title, the following classes of persons shall be deemed to
be engaged in the practice of medicine and surgery:
(1) Persons who publicly profess to assume the duties incident to thie practice
of medicine or surgery.
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of these technicians a conclusion would be reached by the pathologist,
radiologist or physician in charge, hence a diagnosis, and that they were
"serving as the hands of the pathologist, radiologist, or physician in
charge."
This holding that hospital laboratory technicians are practicing medi-
cine is not without judicial dissent. In the only decision in whch this
issue has been squarely presented, the question before the New York
court1 4 was whether a test by a laboratory technician for the RH blood
factor of the hospital patient was a medical act or an administrative act
for which the hospital could be held liable. The court held that the
act was, as a matter of law, an administrative act of fact finding which
bore some relation to the field of medicine, but was not a part of it. One
writer 15 has emphatically expressed this view as follows:
"To say that a hospital may not operate an X-ray department or a
clinical laboratory because in so doing it is engaged in the practice
of medicine is, of course, perfectly absurd and unreasonable. It so
happens that in these two fields the technicial procedures em-
ployed are almost entirely the products of learning of the sciences
of physics, chemistry and biology, and this knowledge belongs to
the general field of learning and not to the medical profession
alone. . . . Indeed, this work is commonly performed by lay
technicians and medical training is not necessary ... "
Whether the technicians working in the pathology and X-ray lab-
oratories are engaged in the practice of medicine or not, it is to be
emphasized that the issue of unqualified persons practicing medicine on
the public was not involved, since the defendants did not seek a change
in the manner of doing the work or of the personnel who performed it.
It would seem the only evil which the defendants sought to have cor-
rected was the billing of patients and the setting of fees by the hospitals
instead of by the pathologist and radiologists. 16
(2) and (3) In reaching its decision that by employing these persons
which the court found to be practicing medicine the charitable hospital
corporations were thus engaged in the illegal practice of medicine, the
(2) Persons who prescribe or prescribe and furnish medicine for human ail-
ments or treat the same by surgery.
(3) Persons who act as representatives of any person in doing any of the things
mentioned in this section.
11Berg v. New York Society for relief, 136 N. Y. S. 2d, 258 (1954).
" Medical Education and the Public, Earl D. McKinley, M. D., Dean of George
Washington School of Medicine.
" The issue, as seen by Dr. Snoke, president of the American Hospital Associa-
tiofi, and a witness for plaintiff, was tersely expressed: "It involves a handful of
dirty bills. If the pathologist gets them, then he is legitimate. If he draws
a check, tien he is illeitiate. It doesn't make'sense." The Burning Questio it
Iowa, Vol. 81 Hospital Management 58 (Jan. 1956).
[Vol. 34
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trial court gave a literal construction to the Iowa Practice Act, the rele-
vant portion of which follows :17
"Qualifications: No person shall be licensed to practice a pro-
fession under this until he shall have furnished satisfactory evi-
dence to the department that he has attained the age of 21 years
and is of good moral character. .. ."
The court reasoned that under this act, a corporation, not being a "per-
son," could not qualify, and stated that Iowa is in accord with the
general rule that a corporation cannot practice a profession.1 8  The
court quoted from the case of Dr. Allison, Dentist v. Allison.19
"It (a corporation) can have neither honesty nor conscience, and
its loyalty must, in the very nature 6f its being, be yielded to its
managing officers, its directors, and its stockholders. Its em-
ployees must owe their allegiance to their corporate employer, and
can not give the patient anything better than a divided loyalty."
The court felt that the charitable nature of these plaintiff-hospitals had
no bearing on the application of the practice acts, citing cases in which
collection agencies, organized as non-profit corporations to collect for
non-profit corporations were held to be engaged in the illegal practice
of law.20 The court stated that good motives did not provide an im-
munity from the application of the practice acts, and that the reasons
given in the decisions condemning corporate practice generally are
applicable to non-profit corporations.
This challenge of the right of hospitals to operate laboratory and
X-ray facilities is one of first impression and, in fact, no reported cases
1' Iowa Code, ch. 147.3.
18 The court cited the following authority and cases in support of the general
rule that a corporation cannot practice a profession: 13. Am. Jur. 838; People by
Kerner v. United Medical Services, Inc. 362 Ill. 442, 200 N. E. 157, 103 ALR
1229 (1936), (operation of a clinic for profit by a corporation of laymen) ; State v.
Kindly Optical Co., 216 Iowa 1157, 248 N. W. 332 (1933), (corporation of laymen
operating an optical business for profit and employing optometrist) ; State v. Baker,
212 Iowa 571, 235 N. W. 313 (1931) (lay clinic for cancer cure) ; State v. Bailey
Dental Co., 211 Iowa 781, 234 N. W. 260 (1931), (corporation of laymen who
operated a dental business for profit by employing licensed dentists) ; People v.
Painless Parker Dentists, 85 Colo. 304, 275 Pac. 928 (one of a series of actions
brought against a dentist who changed his named to "Painless" and established
a network of corporations to pratice dentistry).
360 Ill. 638, 196 N. E. 799, 800 (1935).
20 People ex rel. Chicago Bar Association v. Motorist Association of Illinois
354 I1. 595, 188 N. E. 827 (1933) ; Hospital Credit Exchange v. Shapero, 59
N. Y. S. 2d 812 (1946).
In the latter case, the court stated at page 816, "not so easily is the law cir-
cumvented . . . any organization could thus become a charitable corporation if it
organized under the membership corporation law instead of under the stock ex-
change law, if it undertook tb serve only charitable corporations, and if after
remunerating its staff however handsomely it distributed its so called profits among
its clients." The court quoted this in the principal case.
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have been found where courts have directly prevented "corporate prac-
tice of medicine"21 by a charitable institution. An examination of this
area of the law should be useful in determining the probable result on
appeal. At the outset it should be noted that while numerous state
statutes directly forbid the corporate practice of law,22 express prohibi-
tion of the corporate practice of medicine is rare. Instead, denial is
based, as in the instant case, upon those statutes regulating the licensing
of persons practicing medicine and surgery,23 with which provisions
corporations can not comply.24 While broad expressions abound which
catagorically deny to corporations the right to practice medicine,25 an
observation should be made that these decisions, chiefly involving the
practice of dentistry and optometry, concern corporations operated for
profit, and underlying most all of them, as well as those decisions
cited by the trial court,26 is an unmistakable element of quackery.
While it is clear that by any construction of state practice acts, a
corporation itself could never, be licensed to practice one of the learned
professions, the inference that they automatically forbid any utilization
of the corporate device is not so patent. It has been suggested,2 7 that as
the judiciary has no intrinsic power to regulate the medical profession as
it does the legal profession, since judicial power over the legal profession
rests on the status of the lawyer as an officer of the court,28 the validity
of the viewpoint that the state licensing statutes forbid any corporate
practice of medicine depends upon the soundness of the inference that
they automatically forbid utilization of the corporate device.
By any view, a proper construction and application of these statutes
would seem to require that regard be had for their purpose. Uniformly,
the function of these laws has been said to be the protection of the
2 Exception has been taken to the use of the term "corporate practice of medi-
cine." In 6 LAW AND CONTEmpORARY PROBLEMS 225 (1931), the writer points out
that the phrase conceals faulty analysis. It is pointed out that it is not the act
of the agent which is imputed to the corporate employer, but rather its conse-
quences, so that by a proper application of these principles, if the act of the
agent in furnishing medical services has been within the proper scope of pro-
fessional conduct, there is no liability consequent upon it to be imposed on the
corporation, and hence no occasion for use of the term corporate practice of medi-
cine. It seems a nice distinction.
22 Typical Statutes are: Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1935), c. 32, 411; Mass.
Gen. Laws (1932) c. 221, 846; N. Y. Penal Law 280.
22 Laws and Board Rulings Regulating the Practice of Medicine in the United
States (abstract published by American Medical Association, containing in con-
venient form the legislation pertaining to the practice of medicine in every state).
2Pacific Employees Ins. Co. v. Carpenter, 10 Cal. App. (2d) 592, 52 P 2d
992 (1925) ; People v. United Medical Service, 362 Ill. 442, 200 N. E. 157, (1936).
" See the numerous cases cited in 102 ALR 343 (1936); 103 ALR 1240
(1936) ; 119 ALR 1290 (1936).
2 See footnotes 8, 9, 10, and 18, supra.
2'48 Yale Law Journal 346 at 347 (1938).
2"Ex Parte Wall, 107 U. S. 265, 273 (1882) ; People ex rel. Ill. State Bar
Ass'n v. Peoples Stockyards State Bank, 334 Ill. 462, 474, 176 N. E. 901, 906
(1931). No similar basis has been claimed over the medical profession.
[Vol. 34
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public from quacks and charlatans, and the preservation of the public
health by exclusion from medical practice of persons with inadequate
ability, morality, and training.29 One writer has suggested 0 that
as the corporation itself would be unable to perform any of the purely
personal functions of practicing medicine, there would seem to be no
valid reason, within the intent of the licensing statutes, to require that
the corporation be licensed so long as all the individuals administering
to the public are licensed. The ultimate issue would then become
whether in each individual case those licensed persons are controlled in
their professional functions by unlicensed persons in such manner as to
nullify the purpose of the licensing statutes. However, as has been
pointed out,3 ' this oversimplication ignores a public policy objection to
corporate practice of medicine which lies within the sphere of individual
motivation. Other of the most common public policy objections to the
corporate practice of medicine have been stated to be impairment of the
intimate doctor-patient relationship and commercialization of the medical
profession.
3 2
In any event, it is common knowledge that many forms of corporate
practice of medicine are employed.33 Railroads and large industrial con-
cerns have long employed doctors to administer to their employees.
Hospitals all employ interns and resident physicians on salary; group
health plans have been organized to provide services of physicians to
members in plans analogbus to hospital insurance programs, and more
recently, physicians have themselves incorporated in large clinics to avoid
liabilities for acts of member physicians attendant to partnerships. Al-
though for the most part their legal status has not been determined,
those decisions which have dealt with the matter have by no means been
unanimous in holding the activity illegal.
Without adopting the view that the licensing statutes do not forbid
per se the utilization of the corporate power, it is impossible to recon-
cile the decisions which allow some corporate forms of medical practice
to exist in the face of decisions denying it in others. It is submitted that
underlying the decisions in the better reasoned cases which do not talk
2
1 Laws and Board Rulings Regulating the Practice of Medicine in the United
States, note 23, supra.
30 Op. cit., note 27, supra.
31 Laufer, Ethical and Legal Restrictions on Contract and Corporate Practice
of Medicine, 6 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMs, 525 at 527 (1939).
" People v. Pacific Health Corp., 200 Cal. 160, 82 P. 2d 429 (1938) ; People v.
United Medical Service Inc. 362 Ill. 422, 455, 200 N. E. 157, 163 (1936). Plain-
tiffs argued that because of the lack of profit motive of the corporate employer,
and because pathologist and radiologist are doctors's doctors, these public policy
objectives were inapplicable.
11See, generally, 1 Fletcher, Corporations (perm. ed. 1931) 897, Davis, Do
Corporations Practice Medicine? Proceedings 1932, 88, et seq.; 17 N. C. L. REv.
183 (1939) ; 37 Micr. L. REv. 961 (1939).
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in broad terms of "illegal corporate practice of medicine," is the judge's
concept of how the arrangement in controversy actually operates, as
against a background of the purposes of the medical practice acts and
public policy objections to the corporate practice of medicine.
In a California decision 34 a stock corporation operated by laymen
for a profit sold contracts which entitled the holder to medical services
by a designated physician. The court held this to constitute the unlaw-
ful practice of medicine. Emphasis was placed by the court on the
profit motive of the corporation.86  In a District of Columbia case, ° an
opposite result was reached. In that case, a Group Health Association,
a non profit corporation, was organized by federal employees to provide
medical service on a monthly payment basis. The court distinguished
the admittedly illegal practice of medicine by a corporation from merely
furnishing medical services, and found the corporation to be legal.
Since neither of the corporations in the foregoing cases actually
sought to "practice medicine" but rather both were "furnishing medical
services," any distinction which does not take the public policy merits
of the two cases into consideration must be indeed fancifulB7
In United States v. American Medical Association,8" the court ob-
served:
"In all the cases we have examined in which the practice (of medi-
cine by a corporation) has been condemned, the profit object of
the offending corporation has been shown to be its main purpose,
and in no case were the circumstances precisely like those de-
scribed in the indictment, i.e., a non-profit organization conducted
so that the proper doctor-patient relationship is preserved. .. .
While the issue was decided on the pleadings, the court stated that it
considered the corporation, similar to that described in the District of
Columbia case, to be legal.
New York decisions are clearly committed to the proposition that
"'People v. Pacific Health Corp., note 32, supra.
" Ibid., at p. 166, the court stated, "Such activities are not comparable to those
of private corporations operated for profit and, since the principal evils attendant
upon corporate practice of medicine spring from the conflict between the pro-
fessional standards and obligations of the doctors and the profit motive of the
corporation employer, it may well be concluded that the objections of policy do
not apply to non-profit institutions. This view seems implicit in the decisions of
the courts and it has certainly been the assumption of the public authorities,
which have, as far as we are advised, never molested these organizations."
" Group Health Ass'n v. Moor, 24 Fed. Supp. 445 (D. C. D. C. 1938).
17 Ibid., p. 446, clearly enunciates as the basis for its decision,
"The question here is one of statutory construction. It is evident that the
purpose of the statute was to protect the public from quacks, from the ignorant
and incompetent. The actions of the plaintiff in no way tend to commercialize
the practice of medicine."




charitable and public institutions in corporate form may practice medi-
cine.30 In the case of Goldwater v. Citizens Casualty Co. of New York,40
the issue was the right of plaintiff-hospital to collect for surgical fees
for an operation performed by a staff surgeon. It was not alleged
that the laboratory and X-ray services provided by the hospital consti-
tuted the practice of medicine, but it was argued that actual surgical
services performed by physicians working for the hospital did constitute
the practice of medicine and was unlawful under the New York Medical
Practice Act. The court stated :41
"It is common knowledge that in addition to maintenance, hos-
pitals provide a multitude of other services such as X-rays, lab-
oratory tests, physical therapy, medicines, the use of their medical
and surgical treatment....
"The general rule that a corporation may not practice medicine
has its exception in charitable hospital corporations which are
organized for the express purpose and are sanctioned by law to
treat the sick and injured ......
Thus it will be observed that the courts have in many instances recog-
nized the social utility of a particular corporate form and found the
general rule inapplicable.
The social utility of operation by hospitals of laboratory and X-ray
services would seem to be well worth consideration. The trial judge
in his decree stated that nothing therein should be construed so as to
deny to the hospitals the right to own these laboratory and X-ray facili-
ties. Since the hospitals, by this decree may own, but not operate these
facilities, they are faced with two alternatives. They may either sell
these facilities outright and contract the work outside, thus losing 24
hour-a-day standby service, or they may lease these facilities to the
pathologists and radiologists. The latter alternative could lead to com-
plications of no small proportions. Some of the possible complications
which have been suggested 42 are:
(1) Many state supreme courts have held that county facilities may not
be leased, and a number of county hospitals are involved in the
action.
(2) The Code of Iowa, 1954, as well as most state laws, exempts from
" Goldwater v. Citizens Casualty Co. of New York, 7 N. Y. S. 2d 242 (1938);
Jewish Hospital of Brooklyn v. Doe, 252 App. Div. 581, 300 N. Y. S. 1111 (1937);
People v. John H. Woodbury Dermatological Institute, 192 N. Y. 454, 85 N. E.
697 (1908) ; Messer Co. v. Rothstein, 129 App. Sev. 215, 113 N. Y. S. 772, aff.
198 N. Y. S. 32, 92 N. E. 1107 (1910).
"0 7 N. Y. S. 2d, 242 (1938). The trial court conceded that if the Goldwater
case is the law of Iowa, the plaintiffs must prevail.
,Ibid., p. 246."The Burning Question in Iowa, note 16, supra.
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taxation grounds and buildings of charitable hospitals used solely
for their appropriate objects, and not leased or otherwise used with
a view to profit. Thus a lease to a private practitioner, engaged in
practice for a profit, presents the problem of a possible loss of tax
exemption.
(3) Under the Hifi-Burton Act, which provides for federal grant in
aid to hospitals, a hospital must be entirely non-profit to qualify, and
some fear that a lease of facilities to a profit-making group may
make the leasing hospital ineligible.
In view of the long standing and almost universal practice of opera-
tion by hospitals of these facilities, and the tremendous degree of public
interest involved,43 it is to be hoped that whatever the outcome, the de-
cision will be fashioned from the court's consideration of whether the
arrangement in controversy offends either the purposes of the medical
practice acts or is attended by any of the common public policy objec-
tions to the corporate practice of medicine.
It is hoped that the Iowa court will reconsider the broad maxim con-
demring all corporations alike. While it undoubtedly served satis-
factorily in the past when it was invoked against anti-social activities
exclusively, it becomes oppressive when applied to corporations operated
for the public benefit.
JACK T. HAMILTON.
Sales-Breach of Warranty-Allergies
A condition diagnosed as weeping dermatitis appeared on plaintiff's
scalp and neck after she had used defendant's hair rinse.1 She sued for
breach of warranty of fitness for the purpose intended. There was no
evidence of deleterious or poisonous substances in the product. The
evidence introduced was that plaintiff applied the rinse to her hair;
that as a result she contracted dermatitis, and that a friend had a similar
experience with the same rinse. The court refused recovery, indicated
that her injury might have been caused by an allergy, and added: "... in
an action by the buyer of a product against the seller for breach of
warranty to recover damages for injuries resulting from the use of the
product, there is no liability upon the seller, where the buyer was
allergic or unusually susceptible to injury from the product, which fact
was wholly unknown to the seller and peculiar to the buyer."
2
' Of especial interest to the public is the effect upon the various Blue Cross
plans of hospital insurance, which now insure and pay for laboratory and X-ray
services furnished by hospitals, since it is a part of the hospital bill. Some fear
this plan may be impaired and disrupted if the charges are made by the doctor.
Hanrahan v. Walgreen Co., 243 N. C. 268, 90 S. E. 2d 392 (1955).
'Id. at 269.
[Vol. 34
